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Abstract
Although there has been an increase in the overall financial services market, the profitability of
banks world-wide has decreased from the early 1980s to the 1990s. This has been attributed to
several factors: the decline of traditional banking activities (deposit taking and lending); poorly
performing debts (arising from poor lending decisions); and, for domestic banks, depressed property
prices and important local industrial sectors performing badly. However, the analyses of bank
performance tend to be short-term and narrow in their outlook, and seldom attempt to explain the
underlying trends and processes of change. In this paper it is argued that the broad competitive forces
of information technology, globalisation and deregulation are destabilising the banking industry
leading to irrevocable changes which allow new entrants, disintermediation, innovation and custo-
mer changes on a much greater scale than has occurred in the past. These concepts are illustrated
using a range of different bank markets as examples. To compete in these new markets different
approaches are needed, and a series of possible strategies for addressing new bank markets are
outlined with reference to size and type of bank. The long-term outlook for banking is discussed
with particular attention being focussed on the changing role of universal banks. ! 1998 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Globalisation; Deregulation; Universal bank markets; Declining profitability; Focus
strategies
1. Introduction
Information technology creates new opportunities for the banks in the way they organise
product development, delivery and marketing. IT also allows other financial and even non-
financial organisations to start offering bank services. Similarly deregulation both within
countries and across national boundaries allows increased international competition
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between banks, financial and non-financial organisations. Bank markets in general, like
many other markets, are also becoming more global.
The combination of new IT, deregulation and globalisation pressures ensures that new
ideas and innovations spread quickly and break down the traditional barriers to entry in the
banking industry. This can be seen clearly in the internationalisation of retail financial
services (including banking), particularly across Europe and the USA, by the development
of novel banking systems such as Digicash (Holland and Cortese, 1995) and IBOS (Econ-
omist Intelligence Unit 1994) and the growth of retailer and automotive company activ-
ities in what were once traditional bank markets such as deposits and loans. For example
Ford Financial Services generates over a billion dollars in profit for the car maker and dis-
intermediates the banks from their traditional role of providing finance for automotive
purchases (Kapoor, 1994, 1995).
Overall, these factors have resulted in a decline in universal banking i.e. the provision of
most or all financial services under a single, largely unified banking structure (Heffeman,
1996), which has led some commentators to question the long-term viability of retail
banks (Anon, 1996). The decrease in the profitability of universal banking was attributed
to a number of factors, notably poorly performing loans made to domestic corporate
customers by American, UK and French banks and also international loans to less-devel-
oped-countries (LDCs), high cost bases, and increased competition. Bad loans are clearly a
short-to-medium term crisis which can be overcome if an individual bank has sufficient
reserves. Similarly a high cost base can be reduced over time by prudent management and
rationalisation after merger. However, the level of competition will continue to grow and
take many innovative forms. The focus of this paper is to examine the nature of the new
competitive environment for banks, in particular the role of IT in (1) enabling bank
markets and competition to become more international; (2) supporting new entrants’
strategies; and (3) enabling innovation in banking.
Globalisation and information technology are combining to create a more unstable
banking environment in which new entrants and innovation are reducing the traditional
income streams of banks. The dynamics of the banking industry are related to the reduc-
tion in revenues and it is postulated here that, in general, the universal banking industry is
entering a spiral of decline. The strategic responses of most large banks, particularly the
trend towards mega-mergers and internal cost-cutting, are shown to be insufficient in the
long term to offset the reduction in income and counter the new competitive forces. A
range of strategic options are outlined that will allow a minority of individual banks to
prosper in the new banking environment and these options will be discussed with reference
to different sizes and types of banks. To understand the dynamics of the banking industry,
it is necessary to consider the collective impact of globalisation and IT on the strategies
and structures of individual banks. Research on the effects of these forces in banking tends
to be narrow in its focus, for example analysing one market segment (Large 1996, cross-
border payments), a specific type of technology (Tomasula 1996, relational databases) or a
limited geographic market (Javetski 1996, French banks). This is true both for academic
research papers and for many market research projects carried out by the banks. The
purpose of this paper is to give an overview of the diverse range of phenomena occurring
in the banking industry and explain them in theoretical terms. The research is of impor-
tance for gaining a general understanding of the banking industry and also for providing
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insights into the development of individual bank strategy. In the next section an overview
of universal bank markets is presented.
2. Universal bank markets
The competitive forces in banking have led to a decline in universal banking indicated
by a reduction in the profitability of banks (Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Edwards and
Mishkin, 1995; Danton, 1992; Colwell, 1991). Until the 1980s bank markets were rela-
tively stable and bank profits were high. In the early 1970s the net interest spread between
lending and deposit taking accounted for a large percentage of total income (around 80%)
for the four large universal banks in the UK: Barclays, NatWest, Lloyds and Midland. By
1990 the figure was approximately 60% (Colwell, 1991). (The balance of the bank’s
incomes would be completed by fee based income.) This picture is also true for American
banks over the same period; Fig. 1 illustrates how interest income as a proportion of total
income has declined since 1980 in the USA.
For a corporate bank, the ratio of fees to lending would be greater than for a universal
bank but lending income would still provide the bulk of the earnings. In a stable environ-
ment it was possible for banks to secure low risk, high returns on their capital. Losses only
occurred as a result of poor risk management or failed own account trading. However,
significant changes in the competitive forces are destabilising the status quo in banking, as
will now be discussed. (For a broader discussion of the relationships between shrinking
bank markets, bank strategy and risk see The Economist, 1996a.)
3. Competitive forces
The three major forces of deregulation, globalisation and information technology affect
each other and it is their collective as well as individual impact on banks that is of interest.
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Fig. 1. The decline of traditional banking activity in the USA (source: US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
statistics on banking).
Their combined effect is to destabilise traditional bank markets and to create a new
environment for banks in which to compete (see Fig. 2).
Deregulation in the USA banking industry creates new opportunities for regional banks
to compete in other states (Harrington and Warf, 1995), and information technology
makes strategic innovations possible. For example, IT and novel marketing strategies
create opportunities to deliver financial services through alliances which allow the shared
use of technology platforms such as Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) and payment
processing systems. Another example is the global management of international relation-
ships (Javetski et al., 1995; Dwyer, 1995). Bank customers are creating new organisation
structures which are managed on a global scale and co-ordinated through networked
information systems. These structures often involve multiple decision-makers located in
different continents, and complex inter-dependencies exist which require access to finan-
cial expertise across product ranges and geographic boundaries (Javetski et al., 1995). It no
longer makes sense for a bank to treat these types of customers as national entities. What is
needed is an approach that can accommodate the varied demands of the customer by
offering bank products, knowledge and expertise, and relationship management on a
global scale. The only effective way to co-ordinate this type of activity quickly is through
electronic delivery channels.
The number of new entrants into banking markets is rapidly increasing, for
example international banks offering domestic services, financial organisations diver-
sifying into banking, and non-financial organisations such as retailers providing
banking products. With increased globalisation of competition, foreign banks can
enter domestic markets and focus on niche markets. They can ‘cherry pick’ the
most profitable customers by assessing their risk and banking requirements more accu-
rately than a more general marketing offering by the domestic banks. This can, of course,
work in both directions but to make the strategy successful a bank must have some form
of competitive advantage, normally arising from superior information systems and
marketing.
At an aggregate level what has made the competitive forces of deregulation, globalisa-
tion and information technology so powerful in the 1980s and 1990s is the extent of the
changes: deregulation of financial markets on a global scale; the emergence of truly global
trading systems composed of networks of individual organisations; and the creation of
extremely cheap and effective telecommunications networks for both retail and industrial
customers, which make the international flow of trade and bank data an almost trivial
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Fig. 2. Competitive forces in banking.
exercise. Individual instances of change are continuously announced and analysed in the
business press (e.g. see Crane and Bodie, 1996).
4. Illustrative examples
In this section a group of products and services is presented to demonstrate the impact of
deregulation, globalisation and IT on different bank markets. The examples cover a broad
range of markets, customers, banking arrangements and IT solutions and show both the
fragmentation and consolidation that is now possible. The sample of cases was chosen to
illustrate many types of innovation that were being undertaken in the provision of banking
services.
4.1. International wholesale payments market
International payments has traditionally been carried out through the Society for World-
wide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network which was established in
1973 (European Monetary Institute, 1996). Banking regulations ensure that the SWIFT
club of international banks which form the world-wide network of correspondent banks
receive income for managing payment transactions and also from interest earned while the
money is in their temporary control. On a global basis, the scale of international, or cross-
border, payments is estimated to be 250 million transactions in 1994 growing to 750
million transactions by 2004, with monetary values of US$109 trillion and £309 trillion
respectively (Boston Consulting Group, 1996). The administrative control by SWIFT of
the international payments market remained broadly static from the inception of the
SWIFT network to the early 1990s when a range of alternative mechanisms for managing
international funds transfer emerged. The new entrants include IBOS (Holland et al.,
1996), centralised treasury management by corporate organisations (Holland et al.,
1994), and the low price, value-added services offered by global banks such as ABN
Amro and Citibank (Boston Consulting Group, 1996) and smart card technology (Holland
and Cortese, 1995). The effect of these new entrants is to reduce the overall size of the
payments market by offering cheaper and in most cases faster methods of moving money.
The combined effect of the new entrants and innovation is to make the revenues grow
much slower than the payment volumes. Boston Consulting Group (1996) estimate that
revenues generated from this market will grow from US$16 billion in 1994 to US$24
billion in 2004 compared with a threefold increase in payment volumes over the same
period. The reduction in unit prices will have a significant impact at an aggregate level,
particularly on the incumbent systems such as SWIFT. It appears likely that there will only
be a small number of truly global banks capable of processing large volumes of payments
efficiently and that if these banks are able to increase their value-added services then the
SWIFT network will continue to decline in importance.
4.2. Retail banking
In retail banking the traditional relationship has been between the bank’s staff and
individual customers. The bank’s principal role was to act as an intermediary between
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the customer and the financial markets, typically using its own products. With the advent
of electronic delivery channels and the deregulation of the financial services market in
many countries, it is possible for new entrants to offer banking and other financial services
direct to the end customer. Technology such as database marketing, risk management
software and electronic delivery channels such as the telephone, satellite communications,
the Internet or a combination of all of these, allows new entrants quickly and easily to enter
the banking market and select the most profitable customers.
A good example of a foreign bank entering a domestic market and picking the most
profitable customers for a particular product-market is MBNACorporation (Weber, 1994).
MBNA markets credit cards using affinity programs. It contacts organisations whose
members are likely to fit the profile of profitable bank customers and develops a joint
marketing strategy where the profits from the transactions are divided between MBNA and
the affinity organisation. To implement this type of business marketing strategy success-
fully, flexible information systems are needed to manage the large number of individual
consumers and their relationships to particular organisations.
Another example of innovation within the banking industry is the case of First Direct, a
telephone-based direct banking operation which is owned by an incumbent, Midland
Bank. First Direct successfully launched an innovative banking product using simple
technology to offer superior customer service. The effects are to create a new banking
unit with lower cost/income ratios but to add to the total cost of infrastructure for the
parent bank. Similar initiatives are taking place in other financial services such as insur-
ance, for example the case of Direct Line Insurance PLC (Channon, 1996).
The dis-intermediation of the traditional banking structures has several effects: it lowers
profit margins for the banking/insurance industry as a whole; it makes economies of scale
more difficult to realise for financial institutions with expensive legacy systems; and it
raises the expectations of the customer markets because in many cases superior products
are being offered at lower prices.
4.3. Securitization of assets
Companies with a secure cash flow from their customers, for example utility companies
and large retailing organisations, are now able to treat the cash flows as an asset and create
securities whose value is based on the volume and reliability of the cash flows. The
securities can then be sold privately to institutional investors or sold publicly. This system
is advantageous to the issuing companies when the cost of raising funds in this way is less
than the cost using other methods, notably short-term borrowing from financial institutions
such as banks. Securitization of assets has the effect of dis-intermediating the banks from
their traditional role of taking deposits and lending. The combination of deregulation and
information technology are making capital markets easier to access for both the issuers
(normally the company owning the underlying assets such as a large group of customers)
and the investors. This type of activity is likely to grow and erode market share of lending
from the banks.
An example of how this concept has been applied is in the retail pharmaceutical industry
(Schifrin, 1996). Retail pharmacists in the USA manage high volumes of low-value
transactions, and US$40bn worth of the prescriptions market is paid for through health
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care plans where the payment is guaranteed by the customer’s health care organisation.
The risk element in these transaction is 3% which results in over US$1bn underpayment.
Ordinarily the pharmacists would fund their operations through bank loans but a company
has been set up to securitize the payments assets and sell them to investors. Advanced
payment information systems, which connect the pharmacists to the special company set
up to market the assets, aim to reduce the risk of non-payment by credit checking, and
manage funding to the pharmacists and payment to the investors. The whole process takes
the traditional bank out of the cash supply chain.
4.4. Virtual banking
One notion of virtual banking is the replacement of traditional delivery channels for
bank products, particularly bank branches, by electronic channels such as telephone, cable
and satellite TV, the Internet or a combination of these channels. These developments are
being rapidly implemented and are extremely important, but they represent only one facet
of the virtualisation process underway in banking at the customer interface. In addition to
these changes there are significant alterations taking place in the networks of relationships
between banks and their information services suppliers, which represent new forms of
virtual organisations based on the sharing of assets, information and marketing co-opera-
tion through webs of relationships. For example, Barclays virtual global bank offers small
and medium sized national banks an alternative to expensive multiple correspondent
relationships to gain an international presence for payments and receivables (Lockett
and Holland, 1996). Barclays provides an electronic link between its own global market
network and national banks which allows the national banks to reduce their international
correspondent network with the possibility of using Barclays as a single supplier of
international payments and foreign exchange. This is particularly attractive to those
banks whose revenue from reciprocal banking arrangements is smaller than the cost of
maintaining banking relationships measured by IT spend, administration costs and cash
float interest losses.
4.5. Digital cash
Two major objectives of the banking system are to provide liquidity for trade and
security for the exchange of money. As more trade is conducted electronically, the short-
falls of traditional methods of financial exchange through the existing banking systems
become apparent. The high cost of international payments made it particularly difficult to
make one-off, small value deals viable. However, there are now a number of different
digital cash alternatives which can be exchanged between any individuals or companies
world-wide through some form of electronic channel, whether this is the telephone system
or the Internet. The competing digital alternatives to cash include bank offerings such as
NatWest’s Mondex card and Citibank’s monetary systems, and non-bank products from
new entrants such as Digicash and Cybercash (Holland and Cortese, 1995). Taking depos-
its and lending are at the heart of a universal bank’s activities. If digital cash takes over a
significant part of the money supply then the effect on banks will be potentially to reduce
their role as a conduit for financial transactions which could then have knock-on effects for
lending and deposit taking. At the moment banks generally have a good reputation with
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consumers but if a reputable organisation from another industry were to offer a viable
digital alternative to cash then it could reduce the importance of banks.
4.6. Just-in-time (JIT) finance
Commercial organisations require liquidity for trading and need to be able to move
money between divisions within the same company and between themselves and their
customers and suppliers. An important role for banks is to provide the liquidity necessary
for their customers’ trading activities. If a company trades internationally, added complex-
ities are international funds transfer and foreign exchange. Traditionally, companies
would have tended to have multiple bank relationships within each country of operation.
The following examples suggest that the demand for short-term cash borrowings from
banks will diminish as JIT finance becomes more common.
In manufacturing industry the concept of JIT delivery of physical products is well
established and the benefits proven (Browne et al., 1993). The major cited benefits from
implementing JIT techniques in manufacturing are improved performance in asset
management, lead-times and back-orders. Quality is also improved because problems in
business processes become more transparent and can be resolved much more quickly than
when they were hidden by large reserves of stock and work-in-progress. It seems reason-
able that if JIT techniques can be applied to the management of the flow of physical
products though a supply chain then they should also be applicable in a financial context.
The dearth of case examples in finance is because banking lags behind manufacturing
industry in its investment in information technology and concomitant innovation in busi-
ness practice. However some recent examples do demonstrate how JIT finance is begin-
ning to affect banking.
Rabobank is developing a JIT finance system for its customers with the objective of
delivering credit finance on a JIT basis. That is, advance payments will be made by the
bank to an organisation for deliveries and transactions which have actually taken place
between the organisation and its customers (Kerkhof, 1996). Credit to support the devel-
opment of the business is delivered in frequent small quantities to match the actual
logistics processes. The EDI co-ordinator of the bank believes that this method of finan-
cing will result in better risk management which can be passed onto the bank’s customers
through lower interest rates and lower levels of outstanding debt because the debt is only
increased as it is actually needed, rather than taking large amounts of credit infrequently.
This is an interesting example because it demonstrates the viability of new methods of
financing businesses based on inter-organisational use of information systems connecting
the bank with customers and suppliers within a supply chain. However, it may understate
the true potential of JIT money. Motorola and Citibank have developed a global system for
managing the internal treasury function of Motorola and payments with its suppliers
(Holland et al., 1994). The objective here is not for the suppliers of Motorola to receive
finance from the bank on a JIT basis, but to receive payments from Motorola so that cash
flows mirror product flows. Citibank’s principal role is to deliver the payment rather than
provide JIT finance. It can be seen that if all companies started to pay their suppliers as
soon as they received the product then manufacturing supply chains would require much
less financial liquidity, in exactly the same way that stock levels are reduced when JIT
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manufacturing techniques are used. The effect on banks will be to reduce the level of
funding needed to support the working capital cycle of customers because the uncertainty
of their cash flows will be reduced considerably. (There will also be significant effects on
accounting because credit management will be made much simpler.)
5. Case discussion and proposed model
In addition to these examples of market change, there are many others which are
affecting bank profitability, for example smaller margins in the foreign exchange market
(Harveson, 1996) and reductions in the size of profitability of lending and deposit markets
(The Economist, 1996a). The basic argument is that traditional banking strategies and
structures based on high investments in building and legacy computer systems are being
undermined by a combination of innovation within the banking industry and the entry of
new banking products from outside the industry.
The principal outcomes of these developments are grouped under four categories of
change that are affecting banks. The categories are intended to capture the major changes
and distinguish them by differences in competitive strategies. The categories are based on
Porter’s five forces model (Porter, 1980). They are: (1) new entrants from outside the
banking industry; (2) innovation from existing banks which represent a step-change in
business practice; (3) dis-intermediation; and (4) customer changes. The combination of
these forces leads to a spiral of decline in the traditional bank markets which is shown in
Fig. 3.
In all the case examples of different markets cited here, a combination of the forces in
the spiral of decline model has changed fundamentally the size and organisation of the
market. In the case of international payments, the new entrants include IBOS, smart cards,
Digicash and company-based cash management systems designed to reduce the volumes
of payments to the banks by off-setting cash flows within a group of companies (Holland et
al., 1994; Holland and Cortese, 1995). The effect of these new entrants is to reduce the
overall size of the payments market by offering cheaper and in most cases faster methods
of moving money. Similarly, in the retail banking example, the traditional relationship has
been between the bank’s staff and individual customers. The bank, typically using its own
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Fig. 3. Spiral of decline model.
products, acted as an intermediary between the customer and the financial markets. Elec-
tronic delivery channels and the deregulation of the financial services market in many
countries have made it possible for new entrants to offer banking and other financial
services direct to the end customer. These new entrants can quickly and easily enter the
banking market and select the most profitable customers by using technology such as
marketing, risk management software and electronic delivery channels. This dis-inter-
mediation of the traditional banking structures has several effects: it lowers profit margins,
it makes economies of scale more difficult to realise for banks with expensive legacy
systems, and it raises the expectations of the banking market as a whole because superior
products are being offered in many cases. Another form of dis-intermediation is shown in
the case of securitization of assets where banks are taken out of the traditional money
supply chain. Virtual banking is an example of an innovation from existing banks which
provides a step change in banking practice. It improves the throughput of the processes of
one of the partners, and allows regional banks to offer an international service to its
customers. In the case of digital cash the innovation is both from within and beyond the
banking industry. It may encompass all the categories of change including that of custo-
mers. The final cases of JIT finance are clear illustrations of customer changes. In these
instances the dominant forces are the customers who are applying the same management
approaches to money as they have successfully done to logistics. All of the cases show to
varying extents how the combination of new entrants into traditional bank markets, custo-
mer changes, innovation in products and processes, and large-scale dis-intermediation of
universal banks is leading to a decline in profitability and the reduction of universal bank
markets.
The prediction from the spiral of decline model is that income streams for a universal
bank are gradually declining because of new entrants, customer changes, disintermedia-
tion and innovation. If declining revenues are combined with economic cycles one would
expect a cyclical downward curve of revenues and profitability. Although the cost-cutting
of the banks improves the profit level, it is postulated that simple cost-cutting or economies
of scale from shared operations arising from mergers will be insufficient to counter the
long term loss of revenues. In some instances universal banks were innovative but in
general their organisations and culture encourage inertia, and it is unlikely that they can
be the principal agents of change. The situation can be compared to that of the computer
mainframe manufactures a decade ago, which resulted in the major developments occur-
ring beyond their organisational boundaries.
6. The strategic response of banks
The main strategic response of universal banks with expensive building and system
infrastructures has been to cut costs using a variety of methods. The most obvious change
to the banking industry is the spate of mergers and acquisitions (The Economist, 1996b),
where economies of scale arising from shared technology and a larger customer base are
cited. However, significantly better customer service is rarely mentioned. Although cost
cutting serves the purpose of maintaining profits in the short run it does not address the
more fundamental issues of poor customer service, slow product innovation and falling or
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static revenues. It has also led to internecine debates about cost allocation of central
systems to individual product groups and new product investment. This is particularly
noticeable in banks that have launched innovative products, such as telephone banking,
which compete directly with established products. An internal focus on cost-cutting and
management de-layering inevitably affects the ability of a bank to understand its custo-
mers’ needs and may mask the spiral of decline. The increased sophistication and will-
ingness of customers to switch banks exacerbates the situation. A different approach to
market strategy for existing universal banks is to focus on a particular stage of the value
chain as outlined in the next section.
7. Focus strategies
The universal bank’s markets are still determined by the historic influence of providing
a wide range of services to a broad localised target market. The key reason for attempting
to capture as large a share as possible of a local market was to cover the fixed cost of
operating a branch which until recently completed most of the value added functions for
the customer (sales, processing and localised decision making/risk taking). In their own
local markets banks typically have a high share of the existing business (see Fig. 4).
A number of institutions are attempting to sustain the cost savings of removing the
individual processes from the branches and increasing the scale efficiencies of the centra-
lised processes by merging with similar types of organisation. This may improve the
position in the short term but in essence it is using the merger as a defence mechanism
against the other market pressures discussed in this paper. However, those institutions that
proactively use the development in technology to change positively the way that they
produce and deliver services to meet the developing needs of specific market segments
have a strong potential to increase their market share. Examples of this approach include
the following:
1. Rather than attempt to replicate their existing vertically integrated business in new
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Fig. 4. The historical value chain for a universal bank.
markets, the universal banks can focus on developing their total global market share of
a specific portion of the value chain.
2. The processing and risk-taking capabilities of separate financial institutions can be
integrated to produce an electronically delivered packaged product that looks as though
it is has been produced by the institution managing the client relationship (the distri-
butor).
3. The ability to integrate processes offered by separate financial institutions has greatly
reduced the entry costs to markets by enabling the new entrant to purchase the compo-
nents of its financial products on a variable basis rather than building the whole infra-
structure.
These concepts are developed into generic universal banking strategies which are
already discernible in the leading financial institutions and are discussed more fully below.
7.1. Processing business
Once a financial institution has invested in automating a particular internal process it
has the potential to offer the capability to other institutions that have yet to make the
investment. By centrally processing transactions for a number of institutions the unit cost
can be reduced to each of the players. The universal bank providing the service increases
its income to fund further developments and further specialise in the production of a
specific process. While this is common practice in credit card and payment processing
within the USA, there is the potential for a world-wide market to develop with the
concentration of core processing sites from thousands of internal providers to three or
four global producers.
Before investing in automating an individual process large universal banks should
determine if they believe they can develop the capability into a service that can serve a
global customer base. If they cannot then efforts should be made to develop an alliance
with an institution that has already made a large portion of the investment and that is
looking to build scale economies. By passing the processing capability to another institu-
tion the benefits of automation should be delivered earlier, access provided to a higher
level of investment in developing the service, and capital that would have been used to
build the capability is freed up to invest in an area in which the bank has a real strength.
7.2. Global risk management
The cost of operating a trading operation in a specific market has been increasing
steadily with the growing sophistication of real-time market information and decision-
making tools used to compete in the markets. The increasing transparency of financial
markets and the ability to link directly to market makers have created the opportunity for
institutions automatically to pass specific elements of risk to the capital and money
markets at a transparent cost without operating their own dealing system.
The risk takers with the ability to provide automated links to their customers can serve a
global customer base of financial institutions in a timely fashion without facing capacity
restraints. The institutions that are willing to link to specialist risk takers eliminate the
C.P. Holland et al. / Journal of Strategic Information Systems 7 (1998) 217–232228
requirement to maintain expensive dealing operations and again free up capital to invest in
areas where they believe they have a strength.
7.3. Global brand
There are several thousand brand names in the global financial industry with relatively
little differentiation to separate their product offerings. Surprisingly few financial institu-
tions approach the marketing expenditure of the leading global brands in other industries
(e.g. Coca Cola, Toyota). By focusing on the needs of specific markets and reducing the
cost of serving the customer base by integrating with specialist risk-takers and processors,
institutions can raise the marketing expenditure to create a global brand. The ability to
directly access customers electronically reduces the barriers to new markets, and the
ability to link electronically to existing institutions serving a market provides the oppor-
tunity to sell branded financial products through established distribution channels.
8. Summary of focus strategies
Universal banks serving a large portion of a local market need to determine which
particular parts of the value chain have the potential to be developed into globally compe-
titive businesses in their own right. By working in partnership with other institutions to
reduce the number of elements that require investment, and by focusing on areas of
strength, the universal banks can continue to improve the capabilities and services
provided to their current customer base while reducing the actual cost of supporting the
services.
The banks that continue to operate a vertically integrated structure focused on cutting
the costs of each specific process by merging with similar organisations or improved
process control are in danger of being unable to respond to the improvement in the
financial services offered by institutions focused on specific global market segments.
Once the market recognises significant differences in the quality and price of the financial
services offered the customers’ historic reluctance to move suppliers could be overcome. If
the existing universal banks leave their response until the time they recognise a reduction
in market share they are unlikely to be able to react sufficiently quickly to recoup their
position.
9. Conclusions
The combined forces of deregulation, globalisation and information technology have
already changed the performances, strategies and structures of individual banks, as
witnessed by declining profitability (Colwell, 1991; Danton, 1992; Gorton and Rosen,
1995), the spate of mergers in the late 1980s and early 1990s (The Economist, 1996b), and
the development of innovative products that exploit electronic delivery channels. The
important point about the impact of IT particularly is that manufacturing industry under-
went similarly dramatic changes approximately 10 years earlier than the banks. The future
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pace of change and scale of restructuring in the banking industry is therefore likely to
increase until at least the year 2005.
The principal argument in this paper is that the bank environment is destabilised by the
competitive forces of globalisation, deregulation and information technology. This leads
to significant and important changes in almost every bank product-market: new entrants,
dis-intermediation, customer changes and innovation. The inevitable result of these forces
is a shrinkage in the size of the universal bank markets and, assuming that banks retain
similar cost structures, a decline in their profitability. The changes to bank competition and
concomitant reduction in the size of bank markets is encapsulated in the spiral of decline
model. The main strategic response of the banking industry so far has been varied but
several patterns emerge: cost-cutting, mega-mergers, increased risk-taking for both tradi-
tional and fee based income, and automation.
Significant cost-cutting strategies are exemplified by the retail banks, particularly in the
UK, but also in other European countries. Such strategies are an attempt to align the cost
structures of incumbent banks with those of new entrants such as direct banking operations
and, in the UK, building societies. However, it is questionable whether making the existing
systems more efficient is a viable response in the long-term as new entrants and banking
innovations continue to develop, further eroding the income streams of traditional banks.
The mega-mergers of Chase Manhattan and Chemical, Mitsubishi and Bank of Tokyo, and
Wells Fargo and First Interstate, represent a size strategy. That is, in response to external
pressures, these banks have growth through mergers and/or acquisitions on the basis that
the biggest banks will perform best in the new environment. Apart from achieving econo-
mies of scale, breadth and depth of product expertise on a global scale are often given as
the logic for these mergers (The Economist, 1996b; Waters, 1995). Implicit assumptions in
the mega-merger strategy are that: (1) size is important in bank marketing; and (2) the
improvements achieved in the economies of scale will be greater than the cost of merging.
These assumptions may be true, but in other industries, particularly manufacturing, there
has been a move away from vertically integrated organisations, which the universal bank
represents, and more attention has focused on the importance of strategic networks of
companies (see Nohria and Eccles, 1992; Konsynski, 1993; Wells, 1996 and Lorenzoni,
1996 for a broader discussion of the theoretical and strategic importance of market
networks). The focus strategies outlined earlier are examples of replacing the vertical
integrated universal bank with a value-chain composed of a network of different banks’
processes. The analogy with manufacturing should not be taken too far because the
handling of electronic information is a far simpler and quicker process than that of
production of a complicated physical product. Technically, the component parts of tradi-
tional bank offering can be assembled quickly and easily and distributed to a global
market.
The increased risk-taking by banks in a an attempt to overcome declining markets has
resulted in higher profits for some individual banks, but at an aggregate level, there has
been an increase in the number of bank failures and total risk (Gorton and Rosen, 1995;
Edwards and Mishkin, 1995; The Economist, 1996a). The growth in automation improves
the performance of existing bank operations but it is unlikely that gradual improvements of
legacy software systems are sufficient to counter the threat of new entrants and dis-inter-
mediation. New entrants into traditional banking markets are an extremely important
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phenomenon. This claim is easily supported when one considers the size, brand name, and
global expertise in marketing of the new entrants: automotive, telecommunications and
software companies. As more trade takes place electronically, the pressure on the banking
system to provide real-time financial support to commercial activities will increase. Inno-
vations such as digital cash, direct access from companies and individuals to capital
markets and JIT finance based on real-time transactions will become more attractive.
The exponential decrease in the cost of technology and changes to the banking environ-
ment mean that the legacy systems and experience of traditional banks may not be as
important as the information technology and marketing skills of new entrants.
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